NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 14 | Number 4

Article 2

6-1-1936

Federally Owned Corporations and Their Legal
Problems
Robert H. Schnell

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Robert H. Schnell, Federally Owned Corporations and Their Legal Problems, 14 N.C. L. Rev. 337 (1936).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol14/iss4/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

FEDERALLY OWNED CORPORATIONS AND
THEIR LEGAL PROBLEMS
ROB ET H.

SCHaNELL*

IV
The extensive operations of the government corporations makes the
question of their taxation one of prime importance. To what extent
are the states and municipalities to be denied tax revenue on properties
taken over by the corporations, properties which heretofore have yielded
fairly substantial sums? To what extent should the federal government
permit taxation, and thus partial control, of its instrumentalities?
The doctrine that a state may not impose taxes upon instrumentalities
of the federal government was first expounded in M'Culloch v. Maryland,1 involving a state tax on banknotes issued by the Second Bank of
the United States, a forerunner of the present day federal corporations,
although it differed from those now under discussion in that its stock
was not owned by the federal government. This case was followed by
Osborn v. Bmk of the United States2 which declared unconstitutional a
state law imposing a franchise tax on the Bank of the United States.
This broad proposition that no state has a right to tax the means
employed by the federal government for the execution of its powers was
limited by the case of Thomson v. Pacific Railroads in which a state tax
upon property of a state-incorporated railroad, which was subsidized by
Congress and operated under federal statutes, was held invalid. The
court gave recognition to the doctrine, but also said, "we think there is
a clear distinction between the means employed by the government and
the property of agents employed by the government. Taxation of the
agency is taxation of the means; taxation of the property of the agent
is not always, or generally, taxation of the means." 4 Railroad Company
v. Peniston5 clarified this distinction while holding that a state could
impose a tax even upon the property of a railroad chartered by Congress
but not a tax upon its operations. It was said that a state tax on the
property would in no way hinder the exercise of any powers of the
federal government. California v. Central Pacific Railroad Company6
* Sterling Fellow in Law, Yale University, 1934-35. For the first instalment
of this article see (1936) 14 N. C. L. REv. 238.
117 U. S. 316, 4 L. ed. 579 (1819).
222 U. S. 738, 6 L. ed. 204 (1824).
276 U. S. 579, 19 L. ed. 792 (1869).
'76 U. S.579, 591, 19 L. ed. 792, 798 (1869).
'85 U. S. 5, 21 L. ed. 787 (1873).
'127 U. S. 1, 8 Sup. Ct. 1073, 32 L. ed. 150 (1887).
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also held that a state could not impose a franchise tax on a corporation
chartered by Congress, but added that a state "may undoubtedly tax
'7
outside visible property of the company, situated within the state.
As respects national banks, which receive their charters from the
Comptroller of the Currency as authorized by an Act of Congress,8
Owensboro National Bank v. Owensbora,9 reviewing the cases up to
then, held that states cannot "levy any tax, either direct or indirect, upon
the national banks, their property, assets or franchises," except as permitted by Congressional legislation. 1 °
Williams v. City of Talladega1 involved a municipal privilege tax
levied upon the Western Union Telegraph Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the state of New York and doing a private
business but also operating in accordance with certain federal statutes12
and engaged in governmental activities. The tax was declared invalid
because it made no exemption of that business which was governmental
in character.
The constitutionality of Federal Land Banks and Joint Stock Land

Banks, authorized by an Act of Congress, 13 was upheld in Smith v.
Kansas City Title and Trust Company14 in which the court reaffirmed
the rule that a state may not tax federal instrumentalities except as permitted by Congress and upheld the power of Congress to declare the
bonds issued by these banks exempt from state taxation.
A tax upon the recordation of mortgages was declared invalid as
applied to mortgages owned by Federal Land Banks in Federal Land
Bank of New Orleans v. Crosland.15 The court held that the state was
entitled to charge a reasonable fee to meet the expenses of registration
but that a tax in the guise of a registration fee could not be imposed
upon the Bank.
In summary, these cases stand for the general proposition that a state
may not tax the franchises, operations, and intangibles of a corporation
which is acting as a federal iistrumentality because such tax might tend
to interfere with its performance of its governmental functions, but that
taxation of the tangible property of a corporation, incorporated either
'127 U. S.1, 40, 8 Sup. Ct. 1073, 1080, 32 L. ed. 150, 157 (1887).
813 STAT. 100 (1864), 12 U. S. C. A. §21 et seq. (1926).
'173 U. S. 664, 19 Sup. Ct. 537, 43 L. ed. 850 (1899).
' 173 U. S. 664, 668, 19 Sup. Ct. 537, 538, 43 L. ed. 850, 852 (1899).
'226 U. S.404, 33 Sup. Ct. 116, 57 L. ed. 275 (1912).
1 14 STAT.221 (1866), 47 U. S. C. A. §1 et seq. (1926).
139 STAT. 362 (1916), 12 U. S. C. A. §671 et seq. (1926) ; 39 STAT.374 (1916),
12 U. S. C. A. §811 et seq. (1926).
1255 U. S.180, 41 Sup. Ct. 243, 65 L. ed. 577 (1921).
1261 U. S. 374, 43 Sup. Ct. 385, 67 L. ed. 703 (1923).
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under state or federal laws, acting as a federal agent is permissible when
16
such agent is engaged in business for private profit.
Although none of these cases involve a completely federally owned
corporation such as those under discussion, they are important as setting
forth the principles of state taxation which have been applied to the
prototypes of the present day corporations and will be applied to them.
Cases involving taxation of federally owned corporations first arose
after the World War when questions concerning the war time corporations came to be litigated.
In the first taxation case involving the war-time corporations owned
by the federal government, a Maryland District Court held that the
Emergency Fleet Corporation was a governmental agency, exclusively
employed in governmental work, and as such its property was not liable
to state taxation. 17 A tax levied by Baltimore County, Maryland on
land standing in the name of the Fleet Corporation and on certain
ships, shipyard shops and appurtenances, which were to all effects the
property of the Corporation although they were on land belonging to a
private shipbuilding company, was declared void and its collection enjoined in a suit in which the United States appeared as plaintiff. No
precedents were cited in the decision.
This decision was followed in the case of United States Housing
Corporationv. City of Watertown.18 The court, taking cognizance of
the Thomson and Peniston cases, held that a tax upon property owned
by the Housing Corporation was invalid, saying, "In the instant case
the property itself was the only means and instrumentality by which the
federal purpose could be carried out, and to tax this property would be
to tax an agency solely engaged in carrying out the constitutional duties
of the general government. It would be a tax on the means employed
to carry out a federal power, and this .. .the municipality had no right
to do."' 9 An injunction was issued restraining the collection of taxes
levied on the property of the Corporation.
Shipyard property in King County, Washington, title to which was
" For discussions concerning inter-governmental taxation, see: Powell, Indirect
Encroachment on Federal Authority by the Taxing Powers of the State (19181919) 31 HARv. L. REv. 321, 572, 721, 932; 32 HIv.L. REv. 234, 374, 634, 902;
Cohen and Dayton, Federal Taxation of State Activities and State Taxation of
FederalActivities (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 807; Note, State Taxation of FederalInstrumentalities (1930) 30 COL. L. Rav. 92; Note, Revahation of States' Immunity
from Federal Taxation (1932) 81 U. or PA. L. REV. 194; Boudin, The Taxation

of Gnvernnental Instrumentalities (1933)

22 GEo. L. J.1, 254; Brown, State

Taxation of Interstate Commerce, and Federal and State Taxation in Intergovernmental Relations-1930-1932 (1933) 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 247; Note, Taxation of
Government
Instrumentalities (1935) 1 N. J.L. Rav. 98.
7

' United States v. Coughlin, 261 Fed. 425 (D. C. Md. 1919).
113
N. 312
Y. Supp.
186 Misc.
N. Y. 679,
Supp.186309,
(1920).309 (1920).
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in the Emergency Fleet Corporation, was held to be exempt from local
taxation in King County, Washington v. United States Shipping Board
20
Emergency Fleet Corporation.

The Circuit Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit, in an action brought by the Fleet Corporation to enjoin
the collection of taxes levied upon the property, looked to the fact that

the property was purchased by the Corporation with funds especially
appropriated by Congress for that purpose and not with money paid in
for capital stock of the Corporation. The court said, "Clearly, in the
matter of expending this public money, under the direction of Congress

and the President, in the purchase of property for governmental purposes, and in taking and holding the legal title thereto, the Corporation
was acting as a naked trustee, and the entire beneficial interest was in

the government." And the court added, "And what does it matter that
the Fleet Corporation may, in a measure, have had the status of an
ordinary corporation? . . . The taxable character of property is to be

referred to the status of the real, rather than the nominal, owner."
Shortly thereafter two cases arose involving taxes levied upon the
property of the United States Spruce Production Corporation, a corporation created under the laws of the state of Washington by the Director of Aircraft Production for war purposes and all of whose stock was
owned by the United States.
In United States Spruce Production Corporationv. Lincoln County,
Oregon,21 a district court in Oregon denied a motion by the defendant
to dismiss a bill in which the Spruce Production Corporation asked that
the county be enjoined from collecting taxes assessed against property
standing in the name of the Corporation. The county defended upon
the theory set forth in Thomson v. Pacific Railroad,2 2 that a state tax
may lawfully be assessed against the property of the federal government
but not against the operations of such agent. The court in answering
this argument and holding the tax invalid put its decision upon two
grounds: first, that this tax, even though on property, "would necessarily affect the very means, instruments, and agencies by which the
general government was endeavoring to carry into effect its power to
carry on war; the agency itself

. . .

being exclusively employed

through the use and application of such means and property in governmental work;" second, "that where property, the title to which is in
the principal, is immune from taxes, it is likewise immune if the title
is standing in the name of an agent or trustee for such principal," citing
the King County case.
-282 Fed. 950 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923); Note (1923) 36 HA~v. L. REv. 737.
1285 Fed. 388 (D. C. Ore. 1922).

2 Supra note 3.
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A like situation was presented in United States v. Clallam County,

Washington.2 3 This was a suit brought -by the United States and the

Spruce Production Corporation to enjoin the collection of taxes assessed
against the Corporation. The district court in Washington held the tax
invalid on the ground that the property assessed was the property of the
United States, held in the name of the Corporation, and had not been
used for other than war purposes. The county took an appeal to the
Circuit Court of Appeals which certified the question of taxation to the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that a tax upon the property
of the Corporation was a tax upon the means employed by the federal
government to carry out its purposes and was thus invalid, adding that
since it was clear that the tax could not be imposed, it was "unnecessary
to consider whether the fact that the United States owned all the stock
and furnished all the property to the Corporation taken by itself would
be enough to bring the case within the policy of the rule that exempts
property of the United States."
A tax imposed by Delaware County, Pennsylvania upon lands title
to which was in the Emergency Fleet Corporation was declared invalid
'by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on the ground that
the lands were owned by the United States even though title did happen
24
to be in the Corporation.
Each of these cases involved taxes assessed upon physical properties
of the corporations created and entirely owned by the United States and
used for war purposes. Either theory of exemption of their property
from taxation as set out in the cases seems reasonable and logical and
entirely justified under the circumstances.
A somewhat different case arose in New York where all the stock
of an existing corporation, organized under the laws of New York, was
purchased by an agent of the government with government funds and
transferred to the Secretary of the Navy. The Corporation was operated
by the agent for war purposes. A tax was assessed by the New York
State Tax Commission based upon the net income of the Corporation
for the year 1918. The Appellate Division annulled the assessment,
holding that if the tax were regarded essentially as one upon net income
it was a tax upon federal property and therefore void, or if it were considered as a tax payable for the privilege of doing a business or exercisS283 Fed. 645 (W. D. Wash. 1922), aff'd, 263 U. S. 341, 44 Sup. Ct. 121, 68 L.
ed. 328 (1923).
o'United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation v. Delaware
County, Pennsylvania, 17 F. (2d) 40 (C. C. A. 3rd,
(2d) 722 (1928), appeal dsin'd,per ciuriam, 275 U.
385 (1927), certioraridenied, 278 U. S. 607 (2),
(1928) ; Notes (1927) 27 COL. L. REv. 998; (1927)

1927), aff'd on rehearing,25 F.
S. 483, 48 Sup. Ct. 21, 72 L. ed.
49 Sup. Ct. 12, 73 L. ed. 533
13 VA. L. REv. 504.
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ing a franchise, it was invalid because it would tax operations of the
25
federal government.
Another group of cases arose when the war-time corporations started
liquidating and disposing of their property.
In the city of New Brunswick, New Jersey, the United States Housing Corporation had, during the war, purchased a tract of land and
erected a number of dwelling houses upon it. Beginning October 29th,
1919, some of the properties were sold to individual home buyers under
contracts providing for the immediate payment of ten per cent of the
purchase price and the balance to be secured by mortgages, the Housing
Corporation agreeing to convey a fee simple title free and clear of all
incumbrances. 2 6 The Act of Congress authorizing the Housing Corporation to dispose of its property provided that no sale or conveyance
could be made on credit without reserving a first lien on the property
for the unpaid purchase money.
The purchasers entered upon and took possession of the lots upon
the execution of their respective contracts. Either then or later, each
paid the Corporation the entire percentage of the purchase price which
entitled him under the terms of his contract to receive a deed. Nearly
all of such payments were made prior to October 1, 1920. But because
the city had meanwhile assessed certain taxes on these properties, which
remained unpaid, the Corporation refused to execute deeds to the purchasers; and they, consequently, did not execute notes and mortgages
for the balance of the purchase price.
While the Corporation thus continued to hold the legal title, the city
assessed the lots for taxation to the purchasers for the years 1920 to
1923, inclusive. And thereupon, to prevent threatened tax sales, the
Corporation brought this suit, in which the United States joined as
plaintiff, in the federal court for New Jersey, to have the assessments
cancelled and sales for the collection of the taxes enjoined. None of
the purchasers were parties to this suit.
The district court held that the assessment for the year 1920 was
invalid, but, being of the opinion that the equitable title had passed to
the purchasers under their contracts in such manner as to render the lots
taxable as their property after the dates on which they had become entitled to their deeds, sustained the validity of the assessments for the
year 1921 and subsequent years on all lots for which the purchasers had
" De La Vergne Machine Co. v. State Tax Commission, 211 App. Div. 227, 207
N. Y. Supp. 680 (1925), aff'd, 241 N. Y. 517, 150 N. E. 536 (2) (Mem. dec. 1925).
This was done under an Act of Congress approved July 19, 1919. 41 STAT.
224, 5 Comp. St. Ann. (Supp. 1923) §3115 5/6 e.

FEDERALLY OWNED CORPORATIONS

343

become entitled to deeds prior to the date of the assessments, and denied
an injunction to restrain the sales. 27
On appeal, 28 the circuit court of appeals, being of the opinion that
the assessment of taxes to the purchasers for 1920 and subsequent years,
while the title to the lots was still in the Corporation, was invalid, reversed the decree of the district court and directed it to cancel the
assessment for such years and enjoin the sale of the lots for the enforcement of the taxes so assessed. 29
The Supreme Court modified both decrees and said, "although the
City should not be enjoined from collecting the taxes assessed to the
purchasers by sales of their interests in the lots, it should be enjoined
from selling the lots for the collection of such taxes unless all rights,
liens, and interests in the lots, retained and held by the Corporation as
security for the unpaid purchase moneys, are expressly excluded from
such sales, and they are made, by express terms, subject to all such prior
rights, liens, and interests. This, we think, will meet the equities of the
case as between the Corporation and the City, and fully protect the
paramount right of the United States."3 0
The case of City of Philadelphiav. Meyers 1 applied the decision in
the New Brunswick case and held that a purchaser of realty from the
Federal Housing Corporation, having complied with all the conditions
of the sale agreement, was liable for municipal taxes on that land even
though the government had not yet issued the deed.
These two cases seem to be especially important because of the bearing they will have as to the taxation of subsistence homesteads and other
low-cost housing projects which are to be sold on installment contracts.
In 1920, the Spruce Production Corporation sold certain of its lands
to the Pacific Spruce Corporation under a contract which provided for
the payment of two million dollars in installments, the title to the
property and all improvements thereon to remain in the vendor until the
purchase price was fully paid and other terms and conditions of the
contract fully complied with by the purchaser.* In 1926, when about
$1,000,000 had been paid, Lincoln County, Oregon, imposed a tax on
the estate, right, title, and interest of the purchaser in and to the
property except the paramount interest therein of the United States,
and threatened to impose a like tax in 1927. The buyer brought suit
United States v. City of New Brunswick, 1 F. (2d) 741 (D. C. N. J.1924).
States v. City of New Brunswick, 11 F. (2d) 476 (C. C. A. 3rd,
1926).
The above three paragraphs are taken from 276 U. S.547, 553, 48 Sup. Ct.
371, 372, 72 L. ed. 693, 697 (1928).
ioCity of New Brunswick v. United States, 276 U. S. 547, 556, 48 Sup. Ct. 371,
373, 72 L. ed. 693, 698 (1928).
a102 Pa. Super. Ct. 424, 157 At]. 13 (1931).
'

'United
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against the county to cancel the tax imposed and to enjoin the levying
of the 1927 tax. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed a district court decision in favor of the plaintiff, holding that
the government, through the Corporation, still retained more than the
bare legal title to the property in that it still had an equitable interest in
82
the land sufficient to keep it tax exempt.
Port Angeles Western RailroadCompany v. Clallam County, Washington"3 involved a similar contract under which the Spruce Production
Corporation sold to a private railroad company a railroad constructed
and owned by it, reserving title until final payment. This railroad had
been declared tax exempt in United States v. Clallam County.3

4

After

the purchaser had paid several installments under the contract, the
county assessed the interest of the buyer in the property. The district
court held that the state had no power to tax the tangible property until
the title to the property was conveyed, the United States, through the
Corporation, being owner of the railroad until then.
Later the county assessed taxes upon the right, title, and interest of
the purchaser in the contract for the sale of the railroad. The court, in
a suit similar to the previous one, held that the interest in the contract,
being property, distinct from the land itself and transferable and inheritable, was taxable. This tax cast no cloud upon the title of the
United States to the railroad and was not a tax upon a federal instrumentality.3 5
All these cases clearly indicate that property belonging to the government owned corporations is tax exempt except so far as Congress may
permit. And the language in the various cases also indicates that other
state taxes such as those upon various phases of their operations will
not be permitted.
Nor does it seem probable that the "governmental-proprietary" function distinction which has arisen in connection with the immunity or
non-immunity of state operations from taxation by the federal government will be extended to this field of taxation. In the first place, it
seems doubtful that any such distinction can be made with reference to
the various operations of the federal government. The government has
no reserved powers under which it may enter business as have the
states, and it would seem that as a government of limited powers it can
'Lincoln County, Oregon v. Pacific Spruce Corporation, 26 F. (2d) 432 (C. C.
A. 9th, 1928), aff'g 21 F. (2d) 586 (D. C. Ore. 1927).
20 F. (2d) 202 (W. D. Wash. 1927).
'S pra note 23.
1 Port Angeles Western Railroad Company v. Clallam County, Washington, 36
F. (2d) 956 (W. D. Wash. 1930), aft'd, 44 F. (2d) 28 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931),
certiorari denied, 283 U. S. 848 (4), 51 Sup. Ct. 495 (2), 75 L. ed. 1475 (2)
(1931) ; Note (1930) 8 N. C. L. REv. 479.
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constitutionally exercise only governmental functions. 36 Hence, if the
operations of these corporations are constitutional, they are governmental functions. Further, it is improbable that the federal courts
would make such a distinction and thereby permit an invasion of federal
37
supremacy by state taxation.
If the exemption of these corporations from taxation imposes a hardship upon local taxing districts, the remedy lies with Congress, not the
courts 3 8s
In some of the statutes involving federal corporations, Congress has

specifically mentioned what shall, and shall not, be tax exempt.
Section 10 of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act39 provides that "any and all notes, debentures, bonds, or other such obligations issued by the corporation shall be exempt both as to principal and
interest from all taxation (except surtaxes, estate, inheritance, and gift
taxes) now or hereafter imposed by the United States, by any Territory, dependency, or possession thereof, or by any State, county, municipality, or local taxing authority. The corporation, including its franchise, its capital, reserves, and surplus, and its income shall be exempt
from all taxation .

..

; except that any real property of the cor-

poration shall be subject to State, Territorial, county, municipal, or
local taxation to the same extent according to its value as other real
property is taxed."
Two cases involving the Reconstruction Finance Corporation have
already arisen from its ownership of preferred stock of banks. United
States and Reconstruction Finance Corporation v. Lewis3 91 held that
shares of preferred stock in national -banks located in Kentucky and in
state banks organized under the laws of Kentucky owned by the R. F. C.
were not subject to a state tax levied against the owners of such stock.
The court held that this stock was in reality the property of the United
See, Alabama v. United States, 38 F. (2d) 897, 902 (Ct. C1. 1930), revd by

the Supreme Court without discussion of the merits, 282 U. S. 502, 51 Sup. Ct.
225, 75 L. ed. 492 (1931).
See articles cited supra note 16.
: See, VANr DoRN, GOVENxMENT OWNED COiu'OATONs (1926) 253-254; U. S.
S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation v. Delaware County, Pa., 25 F. (2d) 722
(C. C. A. 3rd, 1928) ; Lincoln County, Oregon v. Pacific Spruce Corporation, 26
F. (2d) 435, 437, 438 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928).
Congress, in a somewhat similar situation not involving government owned
corporations, did aid certain counties in Washington and Oregon by directing the
Secretaries of the Treasury and the Interior to pay to the several counties in
Oregon and Washington within whose boundaries the reverted Oregon and California Railroad Company land grants were located amounts of nioney equal to
the taxes that would have accrued against these lands for the years 1916 to 1926,
inclusive, if the lands had remained privately owned and taxable. Act of July 13,
1926, 44 STAT. 915-916. Cf. fn. * (1928) 14 VA. L. REv. 182, where inaccuracy
appears as to the above.
47 STAT. 5, 9 (1932), 15 U .S. C. A. §610 (1935).
" 10 F. Supp. 471 (W. D. Ky. 1935).
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States and was held by the Corporation only as an agent. The court
discussed the various provisions of the R. F. C. Act and inferred from
such provisions that the corporate entity was fictitious. In the course
of its opinion, the court said:
"There is no doubt whatever that all the property of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation is in reality the property of the United States
Government, and that all the activities of that corporation are just as
much activities of the government as if they were conducted by the
Secretary of the Treasury in his official capacity, or by some other government official. . . . If the Act of Congress, instead of creating the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, had created an executive office and
provided for the appointment of a natural person to fill same, and had
invested such officer with the powers conferred upon the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation, no one could question the proposition that such
officer was an agent of the United States Government, and that all the
property which he held was the property of the United States; and this
is none the less true because Congress has seen fit to use a corporation
instead of a natural person."
The Court of Appeals of Maryland reached a contrary conclusion
when a similar set of facts was presented to it. The R. F. C. claimed
exemption from a Maryland tax levied against it as the owner of shares
of preferred stock of a national bank located in Maryland. The Corporation claimed that it was a governmental instrumentality exempt
from state taxation and that, in addition, Congress exempted the
property of the Corporation, except real property from all taxes. However, the Maryland court held that neither this statute nor the general
governmental immunity extended to stock held by the R. F. C. prevented
the levying of state taxes on such shares39b This case is clearly not in
accord with the previous holdings respecting the taxation of government
owned corporations. Nevertheless, the decision was upheld by the
United States' Supreme Court in Baltimore National Bank v. State Tax
Commission of Maryland.40 The Supreme Court decision was specifically limited to the single question of whether shares in a national
bank, subscribed for and owned by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, might be taxed by a state. In answering this question in the
affirmative, the Court interpreted Section 5219 of the Revised Statutes 4oa which provides that all the shares of a national banking association whose principal place of business is within the limits of a state
are subject to taxation by the state, with certain minor conditions as
"b State Tax Comm. of Maryland v. Baltimore National Bank, 180 Atl. 260
(Md. 1935).
'056 Sup. Ct. 417 (1936).
10a 13 STAT. 99 (1864), 12 U. S. C. A. §548 (1927).
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to manner of imposition. The Court held that "all shares" included
those held by the R. F. C. regardless of the fact that the Corporation
is a governmental agency. The Court did not cite any of the previous
decisions concerning state taxation of government owned corporations,
but confined itself to an interpretation of this statute. Based upon such
a foundation, this decision is still in accord with those previously discussed. But it does, however, represent a departure from the strict
theory of exemption from all state taxation of the several corporations
of the government.
This decision was handed down February 3rd, 1936. On February
10th, bills were introduced in the Senate by Senator Fletcher4ob and in
the House by Representative Steagall 40' which would exempt from
taxation by the several states all preferred stock, notes, and debentures
held by the R. F. C. in national banks and state banks and trust companies. The Senate passed its bill on February 24th by a vote of 38 to
28.40" On February 25th, the House of Representatives took its bill
under discussion, but, after lengthy discussion, rejected it by a vote of
173 to 165.400
About three weeks after the House of Representatives defeate-its
own bill, the Senate bill was taken under consideration on the floor of
the House. An amendment affecting the rates of interest on loans to
closed banks and trust companies was added to the Senate bill. Debate
on the bill was had on several different days,4°0 and on March 19th, the
House passed the Senate bill by a vote of 218 to 144. 40' The Senate
concurred in the House amendment the following day.4°b
The bill was signed by the President March 20th, 1936 to become
the law, 40' and to nullify the effect of the decision of the Supreme Court.
The provisions of the statutes in regard to the Home Owners' Loan
ob S. R. 3978; 80 Cong. Rec. 1763 (1935).
The text of this bill is reported at
80 Cong. Rec. 2698. See also, N. Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1936, at 31.
0 H. R. 11047; 80 Cong. Rec. 1809.
" The bill was reported by the Committee on Banking and Currency (Report
No. 1545) on Feb. 11, 1936. 80 Cong. Rec. 1832.
For the debate and vote by the Senate on the bill, see 80 Cong. Rec. 2672-2668

and 2692-2698.

During the debate an attack was made by Senator Couzens on the payment to
Walter J. Cummings, Treasurer of the Democratic National Committee, of a
salary of $75,000 as Chairman of the Board of the Continental Bank of Chicago
and of $15,000 as Trustee of the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railroad. Mr.
Cummings was named to these positions as the representative of the R. F. C.
100The bill was reported by the Committee on Banking and Currency (Report

No. 1995) on Feb. 13, 1936. 80 Cong. Rec. 2068.
For the debate and vote by the House on the bill, see 80 Cong. Rec. 2837-2864.
"1

80 Cong. Rec. 4030-4031, 4061-4064, 4128-4137, 4216-4241.
Cong. Rec. 4241.
80 Cong. Rec. 4268, 4260-4262. See also 80 Cong. Rec. 4203.
Act of March 20, 1936, Pub. Act No. 482, 74th. Cong. 2nd. Sess.

'0-80
jo,
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Corporation are also very similar to those concerning taxation of the
RFC.41
With reference to the Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation, the
statutes provide: "(a) The corporation, including its franchise, its
capital, reserves, and surplus, and its income shall be exempt from all
taxation . . . ; except that any real property of the corporation shall be
subject to State, Territorial, county, municipal, or local .taxation to the
same extent according to its value as other real property is taxed.
(b) Mortgages executed to the Land Bank Commissioner and mortgages
held by the corporation, and the credit instruments secured thereby, and
bonds issued by the corporation under the provisions of this Act, shall
be deemed and held to be instrumentalities of the Government of the
United States, and as such they and the income derived therefrom shall
be exempt from Federal, State, municipal, and local taxation (except
'
surtaxes, estate, inheritance, and gift taxes). "42
Similarly, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation is
exempt from taxes, except that real property of the corporation is subject to local taxation, and surtaxes, estate, inheritance, and gift taxes
43
may 'be imposed upon its bonds and other obligations.
No provision is made in the Tennessee Valley Act of 1933 as to its
exemption from taxation or granting permission for taxes to be levied
against the corporation. However, Congress provided for the payment
of certain sums -by the Corporation which would approximate the taxes
it might otherwise pay if it were a private corporation. Five per cent
of the gross proceeds received from the sale of power generated at Dam
Number 2 or from any other hydropower plant later constructed in
Alabama is to be paid to the state of Alabama. Likewise, five per cent
of the gross proceeds from the sale of power generated at Cove Creek
Dam or any other plant located in Tennessee is to be paid to the state
of Tennessee. There is a further provision for the payment of two and
one-half per cent to Alabama and the same amount to Tennessee of the
gross proceeds from the sale of additional power generated because of the
44
It is
effects of the operation of one or more plants in both states.
interesting to note that Congress provided that in determining the gross
proceeds the board is not to take into consideration the proceeds of any
power sold or delivered to the government of the United States or any
department or agency thereof nor any power used in the operation of
locks on the Tennessee River or for experimental purposes or for the
'48
STAT. 128, 129 (1933), 12 U. S. C. A. §1463 (c) (1935).
'2 Act of Jan. 31, 1934, §12, 48 STAT. 344, 347, as amended by 48 STAT. 360
(1934),
12 U. S. C. A. §1020f (1935).
' 4Act of June 27, 1934, §402 (e), 48 STAT. 1256, 1257 (1934), 12 U. S. C. A.
§1725 (e) (1935).
".Act of May 18,1933, §13,48 STAT. 58, 66 (1933), 16 U. S. C. A. §831 1(1935).
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manufacture of fertilizer or for any government purposes. Thus, the
states benefit by these payments in lieu of taxes only from those
operations of the Corporation which directly rival the operations of
privately owned power companies. The percentages required to be paid
can be revised by the board with the approval of the President, but no
change in percentages can be made more often than once in five years
nor without giving the states of Alabama and Tennessee an opportunity
to be heard concerning such changes. The board has also adopted the
policy of paying to municipalities and other units of government sums
of money equal to that which the TVA would have to pay as taxes if
it were a privately owned public utility.45
The language in these statutes providing for the exemption from
state taxation would seem in one sense to be ineffectual. The states cannot tax federal instrumentalities except so far as may be permitted by
congressional legislation, and specifically granting these corporations
exemption is giving them nothing more than they already have. Nor
can the enumeration of a number of exemptions serve to remove the*
power of a state to tax if the operations and property of the corporations
could otherwise be taxed.
When the Commodity Credit Corporation, the Housing Corporation,
and the Subsistence Homesteads Corporation (and probably the Surplus
Relief Corporation and the Electric Home and Farm Authority) were
incorporated under the laws of Delaware, the state waived payment of
the ordinary incorporation taxes46 and charged only nominal fees for
services actually rendered, such as the filing of the applications and the
issuing of certificates. Likewise, the annual franchise taxes have been
waived, only a nominal fee being charged for the filing of the annual
report.
However, when the Export-Import Banks took out charters in the
District of Columbia, the recorder demanded payment of the regular incorporation taxes. 47 These were paid under protest, and the certificates
of incorporation issued. The writer is advised that negotiations are
See, Note, State Taxation and Regulation of the Tennessee Valley Authority
(1934) 44 YALE L. J. 326.
"For Delaware fees, see, PARKER AND SmITH, THE CORPoRATION MANUAL
(36th ed. 1935) 290.
I'D. C. CoDE (1929) tit. 10, §14: "All corporations incorporated in the District
of Columbia shall pay to the recorder of deeds at the time of the filing of the
certificate of incorporation 40 cents on each $1000 of the amount of the capital stock
of the corporation as set forth in its said certificate: Provided, however, That, the
fee so paid shall not be less than $25."

Id. tit. 10, §15: "All the fees and emoluments of the office of recorder of deeds
of the District of Columbia shall be paid at least weekly to the collector of taxes
for the District of Columbia for deposit in the Treasury of the United States to
the credit of the District of Columbia."
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under way for the recovery by the Banks of these taxes and that if necessary, legal action will be taken to secure their refund.
Inasmuch as these corporations are authorized by congressional
legislation and executive order and directed to be set up as federal instrumentalities, it would seem that from their inception they are exempt
from state taxation. A state may legitimately impose reasonable charges
for services rendered by the state relative to their incorporation, but
there appear to be no reasons why a state could refuse to charter a
federal instrumentality unless all taxes imposed by law were paid. This
would be a direct interference with and a tax upon the operations of an
48
instrumentality of the national government.
The state chartered corporations have adopted policies of refusing to
pay any taxes imposed by the various states except in those instances
where the tax constitutes a reasonable charge for some service rendered.
An evident exception is the Warrior River Terminal Company, a subsidiary of the Inland Waterways Corporation, which has been paying
to the State of Alabama taxes on tangible property, permit taxes, and
4s
franchise taxes. a
The Wartime Housing Corporation made agreements with local governmental units to pay amounts equal to what it would have paid as
special assessments and ad valorem taxes had its property been subject
thereto. 49. It is doubtful whether the contemporary corporations will
adopt the same attitude. It is more likely that they will take the position
that the federal government is conferring vast benefits upon the states
and localities which more than offset any amount which the state might
collect in taxes if they were not engaged in federal operations. The
Comptroller-General and the Attorney-General have indicated to the
Subsistence Homestead Corporation that it is not to pay state taxes
upon land it buys and owns except that it may make reimbursements for
exceptional services rendered.50
The problem of federal taxation of the corporations is unlikely to
arise. They are directly engaged in governmental functions and for that
reason it would be illogical to impose federal taxes upon them. The
principal and interest of bonds and other obligations of the RFC, the
Home Owners' Loan Corporation, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation, and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation are exempt from federal taxation
ICf. Federal Land Bank of New Orleans v. Crosland, 261 U. S. 374, 43 Sup.
Ct. 385, 67 L. ed. 703 (1923).
" Pamphlet, Annual Report of the Inland Waterways Corporation, Calendar
Year 1933 (Govt. P1rinting Office, 1934) 17, 49.
"Report of the U. S. Housing Corporation (Gov't Printing Office, 1920) Vol.

I, p. 347.

' Advice to writer from the Federal Subsistence Homesteads Corporation.
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by the acts setting up the corporations. This was undoubtedly done to
encourage the purchase of any of their obligations which might be
offered for public sale. However, should Congress for some reason
decide to impose taxes upon the property or operations of these federally
owned corporations, it may properly do so.
V
In respect to crimes concerning a government owned corporation,
the view has been adopted that in such cases the corporations are distinct
entities, apart from the government. This view is laid down by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Strang.5' In that case, an inspector
employed by the Emergency Fleet Corporation was indicted under a
statute making it a criminal offense for an officer or agent of a business
concern to be employed or act as an officer or agent of the United States
for the transaction of business with such concern. 52 The Court said:
"The Corporation was controlled and managed by its own officers and
appointed its own servants and agents who became directly responsible
to it. Notwithstanding all its stock was owned by the United States
it must be regarded as a separate entity. Its inspectors were not appointed by the President, nor by any officer designated by Congress;
they were subject to removal by the corporation only and could contract
only for it. In such circumstances we think they were not agents of
the United States within the true intendment" of the statute. 53
Prior to this decision by the Supreme Court, there had been a division of opinion in the lower federal courts. The first case of this type
to arise concerned an -indictment charging a conspiracy to defraud the
United States. The alleged conspiracy involved the sale of tobacco to
the Panama Railroad Company through its commissary department and
a division of the profits of such sale between the two sellers and the
manager of that department of the railroad. The circuit court OT
appeals held that when the United States enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity, and is to be treated like any
other corporation; and therefore, although it absolutely owns the Panama Railroad Company and is the only one profiting or losing by the
railroad company's activities, a conspiracy to defraud the railroad company is not a conspiracy to defraud the United States within the
54
meaning of the Penal Code.
1254 U. S. 491, 41 Sup. Ct. 165, 65 L. ed. 368 (1921) ; Note (1921) 21 COL. L.
' Crim. Code §41, Act of March 4, 1909, c.321, §41, 35 STAT. 1088, 1097 (1909),
18 U. S.C.A. §117 (1929).
254 U. S. 491, 493, 41 Sup. Ct. 165, 166, 65 L. ed. 368, 369 (1921).
Salas v. United States, 234 Fed. 842 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1916) ; Note (1917) 15
MICa. L. REv.348. Same case, decided on different points, United States v. Burke,
REv. 485.
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On the other hand, two district courts held that conspiracies to defraud the Emergency Fleet Corporation were conspiracies to defraud
the United States within the meaning of the same act. The courts held
that the Fleet Corporation was an agency of the United States expending funds appropriated by Congress and that a conspiracy to defraud the
Corporation would have the effect of depleting such funds and therefore
defraud the government. 5n
In 1918, Congress, by amending section 35 of the Penal Code,
specifically made it a crime against the United States to present false
claims or to aid in the payment of such fraudulent claims, to steal personal property, to conspire to defraud by obtaining or aiding to obtain
the payment or allowance of any false or fraudulent claim, to deliver
false receipts or vouchers for military or naval property, or to fraudulently deliver money or property used for military service, when a
corporation in which the United States is a stockholder is involved."
This statute has been construed and applied in two cases. In United
States v. Bowmnan, 57 a conspiracy to defraud the Emergency Fleet Corporation by presenting and obtaining payment of a false and fraudulent
claim against the Corporation for more fuel oil than was actually delivered was held a federal criminal offense."8 An indictment charging a
similar conspiracy against the Fleet Corporation was sustained in United
States v. Walter."9 The Court said, "the United States can protect its
property by criminal laws, and its constitutional power would not be
affected if it saw fit to create a corporation of its own for purposes of
the Government, under laws emanating directly or indirectly from itself,
and turned the property over to its creature." However, the Court
limited the application of the statute, saying it "should be construed to
refer only to corporations like the Fleet Corporation that are instrumentalities of the government and in which for that reason it owns
stock."
218 Fed. 83 (S. D. N. Y., 1914); United States v. Burke, 221 Fed. 1014 (S. D.
N. Y., 1915).
' United States v. Carlin, 259 Fed. 904 (E. D. Pa., 1917) ; United States v.
Union Timber Products Co., 259 Fed. 907 (W. D. Wash., 1919).
r4Act of Oct. 23, 1918, 40 Stat. 1015 (1918), 18 U. S. C. A. §§80, 82, 83, 84,
85 (1927).
'260 U. S. 94, 43 Sup. Ct. 39, 67 L. ed. 149 (1922), rev'g 287 Fed. 588 (S. D.
N. Y. 1921).
' This was held a crime punishable in the United States even though the conspiracy took place on the high seas on a vessel owned by the Emergency Fleet Corporation, and in the port and city of Rio de Janeiro. This aspect of the case was
noted in (1923) 32 YA.E L. J. 513; (1923) 71 U. OF PA. L. RPv. 173.
'263 U. S. 15, 44 Sup. Ct. 10, 68 L. ed. 137 (1923), rev'g 291 Fed. 662 (S. D.
Fla., 1921); Note (1924) 72 U. OF PA. L. REv. 158 in which the amending of
section 35 of the Penal Code was evidently overlooked.
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Although the Penal Code was amended to cover government owned
corporations before the Supreme Court held in United States v. Strang
that such a corporation was a separate entity, Congress evidently had
that possibility in mind when it amended the statutes. 60 Congress
seemed to recognize the fact that government owned corporations have
a character of their own and are separate and distinct from the government in certain respects.
In a recent case involving an alleged crime against the United States
by a conspiracy to obstruct the proper use of funds of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit did not follow United States v. Strang but held that the R. F. C.
was a direct agency of the government and that any conspiracy against
the Corporation was an impediment to the exercise of a function by the
Federal Government. 61 The defendant was indicted for a violation of
section 37 of the Criminal Code 62 which makes illegal a conspiracy to
commit an offense against the United States or to conspire to defraud
the government. This section was not amended in 1918 when Congress
amended section 35 to include government owned corporations. In
reaching its conclusion that the Corporation was a direct agency of the
government, the court cited the previous cases involving other corporations owned by the United States and distinguished those which
held the corporations to be distinct entities. The court clearly disregarded the ruling of the Supreme Court in the Strang case that government owned corporations were distinct entities and that a crime against
one was not a crime against the United States itself, even though there
was a possibility that the offense might be punishable under federal
laws.
In the acts creating some of the present day corporations, certain
actions in connection with the corporations are made federal criminal
offenses, and certain provisions of the Penal Code are extended to cover
dealings with the Corporations. 63 These provisions were evidently inserted because of the theory laid down by the Supreme Court that a
government corporation is a distinct entity with respect to crimes committed concerning it unless they are covered by statute.
I The offense charged in this case occurred before the enactment of the statute
although the decision was handed -down afterwards.
"Langer v. United States, 76 F. (2d) 817 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935).

114

STAT.

484 (1867) ; 18 U. S. C. A. §88 (1927).

'Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Act of Jan. 22, 1932, §16, 47 STAT. 5,
11-12 (1932), 15 U. S. C. A. §601 (1935); Tennessee Valley Authority, Act of
May 18, 1933, §21, 48 STAT. 58, 68-69 (1933), 16 U. S. C. A. §831 (1935) ; Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, Act of June 27, 1934, §512, 48 STAT.
1246, 1265 (1934), 12 U. S. C. A. §1701 (1935).
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VI

Those cases involving government owned corporations in which the
character of the corporations has been discussed have divided as to their
status. As mentioned previously, the corporations are considered separate entities for the purposes of actions against them for torts and
breaches of contract, but, so far as state taxation of them is concerned,
the corporations are treated as agencies of the government with all the
governmental immunity from state taxation. There are numerous other
individual and groups of cases which also bring out their dual aspect
and which merit consideration.
In 1866, Congress passed the Post Roads Act offering certain valuable privileges to telegraph companies. If the companies desired to
accept such privileges, they bad to agree to give telegrams "between the
several departments of the government and their officers and agents"
priority over all other business at such rates as the Postmaster-General
should annually fix.6 4 This offer was accepted by the several telegraph
companies. The rates are usually fixed at a percentage of the regular
commercial rates.
From 1916 to 1922, the Western Union Telegraph Company transmitted messages for the Emergency Fleet Corporation at the government
rates. In May of the latter year, the Western Union demanded commercial rates for all telegrams sent by the Fleet Corporation. The
company continued sending messages for the Corporation at the reduced
rates, reserving the right to later collect the full rates. The Western
Union later sued the Fleet Corporation to recover for June and July
1922 the difference between the amount paid by the Fleet Corporation
for telegrams sent and the regular commercial rates for such telegrams.
The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia rendered a judgment in
favor of the Western Union. This decision was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals of the District of Columbia, the court holding that even
though the government owned all its stock the Fleet Corporation was a
distinct entity and not such an agent of the government as should be
entitled to preferential telegraph rates.1,5
However, in U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation v. Western
Union Telegrapk Company, 6 the Supreme Court held that the Fleet
-Corporation was entitled to the government rate, not because it was an
"Act of July 24, 1866, 14 Stat. 221 (1866), 47 U. S. C. A. §§1-6 (1928), as
amended by Act of June 19, 1934, 48 STAT. 1064, 1101 (1934), 47 U. S. C. A. §601
(1935) trangfering the duties, powers and functions of the Postmaster General
under the original act to the Federal Communications Commission.
'U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation v. Western Union Telegraph Company, 13 F. (2d) 308 (C. of A. D. of C. (1926) ; certiorarigranted 273 U. S. 681,
47 Sup. Ct. 236, 71 L. ed. 837 (1926).
'275 U. S. 415, 48 Sup. Ct. 198, 72 L. ed. 345 (1928).
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instrumentality of the government, but because it was a department of
the United States within the meaning of the Post Roads Act. The
Court reasoned that the services of the Corporation were obviously of
a public nature and that it never did any business except on behalf of the
United States. Further, since the business of the Corporation was conducted at a continuous loss with the deficit being made up out of the
Treasury, to force the Corporation to pay regular rates would directly
affect the government. The Court said that one of the reason8 for the
use of a corporate agency was to enable the government to employ commercial methods and to conduct its operations with a freedom supposed
to be inconsistent with accountability to the Treasury. But, the Court
added, "it obviously was not the intention of the government in employing a corporate agency to deprive itself of the right of priority of trans6
mission and of the lower rates secured through the Post Roads Act. 7'
There is a dictum in this case which may possibly become important
in any future litigation on the same matter. During the course of its
opinion the Court said, "Instrumentalities like the national banks or the
federal reserve banks, in which there are private interests, are not departments of the government. They are private corporations in which
the government has an interest." It would seem from this that any such
instrumentalities would be held not entitled to preferential rates. The
Federal Land Banks, which are government instrumentalities operated
as a part of the Farm Credit Administration but are only 50% owned
by the government, constitute an example of the corporations which
might come within this grouping.
On the other hand, government owned corporations are not entitled
to preferences in bankruptcy because they are distinct entities. The National Bankruptcy Act provides the order of payment of claims out of a
bankrupt estate. Among those entitled to priority are "debts owing to
any person who by the law of the States or the United States is entitled
to priority."68 The Revised Statutes provide that debts due the United
69
States by any insolvent person or estate shall be first satisfied.
The Emergency Fleet Corporation had a claim against a bankrupt
"Ibid. at 423, 48 Sup. Ct. 198, 201, 72 L. ed. 345, 349 (1928).
In Commercial Pacific Cable Company v. Philippine National Bank, 263 Fed.
218 (S. D. N. Y. 1920), aff'd per curiam, 269 Fed. 1022 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1920), a
bank chartered by a special act of the Legislature of the Philippne Islands and
with 85% to 90% of its capital stock owned by the Philippine government was held
not a department of the government within the meaning of the Post Roads Act.
This bank was a government depositary and did government banking business and
at the same time engaged in extensive private banking operations.
'30 STAT. 563 (1898) ; 11 U. S. C. A. §104 (b) (5) (1927).
11 STAT. 515, 676 (1897, 1899), 31 U. S. C. A. §191 (1927). See, Bramwell v.
U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Company, 269 U. S. 483, 46 Sup. Ct. 176, 70 L. ed. 368
(1926); It re Atlantic, G. & P. S. S. Co., 289 Fed. 145 (D. C. Md. 1923).
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shipbuilding company. This was allowed as a general claim against the
bankrupt's estate, but the Fleet Corporation contended that it should
receive priority as being a claim for a debt due the United States. The
Corporation's argument was that the Fleet Corporation was the agent
or representative of the United States and that the contract was made
for and on behalf of the United States and hence the debt due thereunder was a debt due and owing to the United States and therefore entitled to priority of payment under the statute. The referee in bankruptcy refused to grant such priority and was sustained by the district
court. The circuit court of appeals affirmed the decision, holding that
the Fleet Corporation was a distinct legal entity and that the ownership
of its stock by the United States did not invest the Corporation with
the character of sovereignty or the privileges or immunities of the sovereign, and hence that the Fleet Corporation was not entitled to the
government's priority.7 0 The Supreme Court affirmed these decisions
in Sloan Shipyards Corporation v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Cor72
poration71 using the same theory.
73
In United States v. Wood the government filed a bill in equity
asserting this same claim as its own and asking priority. The district
court dismissed the bill on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to
entertain such a bill, jurisdiction being in the bankruptcy court. The
court based its decision on the further ground that the debt was not due
the United States but was due the Fleet Corporation, as principal and
74
independent contractor, and therefor not entitled to priority.
But notes given in payment of a vessel purchased from the Fleet
Corporation and made payable to the United States, the contract of sale
also being in the name of the United States, have been held entitled to
the governmental priority on the ground that the United States was the
real creditor and the only one in whose name the claim could be
presented.76
The Reconstruction Finance Corporation has been held to be subject
to the bankruptcy laws and the necessity of complying with them as any
ordinary corporation. During the reorganization of the Rock Island
Railway, the R. F. C. and several banks were enjoined from converting
"In re Eastern Shore Shipbuilding Corporation, 274 Fed. 893 (C. C. A. 2nd,
1921), certiorarigranted, U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation v. Wood, 257
U. S. 627, 42 Sup. Ct. 56, 66 L. ed. 404 (1921).
72258 U. S. 549, 42 Sup. Ct. 386, 66 L. ed. 762 (1922).
"Leave was granted to petition for a rehearing in 42 Sup. Ct. 588 (1922) but
evidently was not used.
7290 Fed. 109 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1923), aff'd. per curiam, 263 U. S. 680, 44 Sup. Ct.
134, 68 L. ed. 503 (1923).
' See also, West Virginia Rail Company v. Jewett Bigelow and Brooks Coal
Company, 26 F. (2d) 503 (E. D. Ky. 1928).
' Whan v. Green Star S. S. Corporation, 22 F. (2d) 483 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1927).
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or disposing of various collateral securities held as security for notes
given by the railway. The R. F. C. objected and claimed that sections
77 and 2(15) of the Bankruptcy Act were limited by section 5 of the
R. F. C. Act which empowered the Corporation to take over and liquidate
collateral accepted by it as security. The circuit court of appeals
affirmed the action of the district court in granting the injunction and
was in turn upheld by the Supreme Court. 75' That Court held that
although the R. F. C. is entirely owned by the United States, it is a
corporation limited by its charter and the- general law. The Court said
that the R. F. C. Act did not give the Corporation greater rights as to
the enforcement of its outstanding credits than were enjoyed by other
persons or corporations in the event of proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act and that the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, including
section 77, were binding on the R. F. C. in the absence of some pertinent
statutory exception.
The activities of the United States Grain Corporation gave rise to
an interesting case which involved the question of the status of that
corporation and its relation to the government.
The statutes for the government of the Navy provide that no goods
or merchandise for freight or traffic, except gold, silver or jewels for
76
freight or safe-keeping, shall be received on board a naval vessel.
Navy regulations permitting the carrying of gold on a naval vessel provide that when the officer in command receives any gold on board he
shall sign bills of lading for the amount and be responsible for it. The
regulations then provide that for carrying such gold the shippers shall
pay the usual percentage for freight, to be divided among the commander of the vessel, the commander in chief, and the navy pension
fund, or if the commander in chief does not signify in writing that he
will unite in being responsible for the shipment, the percentage shall
77
be divided between the commanding officer and the pension fund.
In 1919, the United States Grain Corporation owned $5,000,000 in
gold which it wanted carried from Constantinople to New York City.
The Grain Corporation requested and received from the Secretary of
the Navy an order suspending these provisions of the navy regulations
as to carrying gold for a percentage. However, the commanding officer
of the destroyer detailed to carry the gold for the Corporation refused
to waive his responsibility for the shipment and his right to the freight
charges. The gold was delivered in New York and payment of one
per cent of the value of the gold as freight charges was demanded and
" Continental Illinois Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific
Railway Co., 294 U. S. 648 (at 684), 55 Sup. Ct. 595, 79 L. ed. 1110 (1935).
" REv. STAT. 1624, art. 8, subd. 13, 34 U. S, C. A. §1200, art. 8, subd. 13 (1928).

'Navy Regulations (1913) art. 1510.
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refused. Whereupon, the commanding officer of the transporting destroyer commenced an action against the Grain Corporation for that
amount.
Judgment was rendered for the defendant in the district court.
The circuit court of appeals, however, reversed this decision and held
the naval officer entitled to the percentage claimed on the ground that
the Secretary of the Navy was without authority to suspend the provisions of the regulations covering compensation. The fact that the
Corporation shipped the gold and the officer assumed responsibility and
refused to waive his right to compensation was held to entitle him to
recover. The governmental character of the Grain Corporation was discussed only briefly. The court disposed of it, saying, "the government
created this agency but the corporate responsibility is that of a private
corporaton."Ts
The Supreme Court, in United States Grain Corporation v.
Phillips,79 reversed the circuit court of appeals, basing its decision
upon the governmental aspect of the Corporation. The Court deliberately pierced the corporate veil and held that since the government
owned all the stock of the Corporation, the Corporation's property in
effect belonged to the government. Therefore, since the plaintiff was
commander of a naval vessel, he was only acting in the course of his duty
in carrying the gold, gold which belonged to the United States even
though legal title was in the Grain Corporation. The Court held that the
order of the Secretary of the Navy embodied no suspension of the regulations but only a recognition that this was not a service for which the
plaintiff was entitled to extra compensation. The Court in deciding this
case evidently had the attitude that the naval officer was not entitled to the stipulated percentage because the property in question
was closely connected with the prosecution and aftermath of the War
through the American Relief Administration, the Grain Corporation,
and the United States Food Administration, all acting for the United
States. This attitude was summed up when the Court said, "But for
purposes like the present imponderables have weight. When as here
the question is whether the property was clothed with such a public
interest that the transportation of it no more could be charged for by a
public officer than the carrying of a gun, we must look not at the legal
title only but at the facts beneath forms."
United States ex rel Skinner and Eddy Corporation v. McCarl,80
decided three months prior to the Western Union case, 8 ' presents a
Phillips v. U. S. Grain Corp., 279 Fed. 244 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1922).
'261 U. S. 106, 43 Sup. Ct. 283, 67 L. ed. 552 (1923).
8'275 U. S. 1,48 Sup. Ct. 12, 72 L. ed. 131 (1927).
81
Supra note 66.
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distinctly different ratio decidendi. Skinner and Eddy Corporation
brought a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the Comptroller
General to pass upon its claims against the government arising out of
contracts made with the Emergency Fleet Corporation. The claims
were presented to the Comptroller General for allowance because the
Skinner and Eddy Corporation wanted to be in a position to use them
as a credit if the United States should, as was then threatened, sue on
the contracts. The statutes provide that in suits brought by the United
States against individuals no claim for credit can be allowed unless it
has been presented to the General Accounting Office and been disallowed, 82 and the Company thought that such presentation would be
necessary to enable it to use their claims as a set-off to the government's
suit.
Congress created the General Accounting Office in 1921 as an independent establishment of the government.88 The act creating it provides that "all claims and demands whatever by the Government of the
United States or against it, and all accounts whatever in which the
Government of the United States is concerned, either as debtor or
creditor, shall be settled and adjusted in the General Accourfting
Office."'8

4

The office is in charge of the Comptroller General, an inde-

pendent officer appointed by the President for a term of fifteen years
and removable only for cause by a joint resolution of Congress or by
impeachment proceedings. He is not eligible for reappointment.8 5 All
expenditures of the government are audited by the General Accounting
Office, and the present Comptroller General has kept a close check on
all government spending.
Control over the financial transactions of the war time corporations
was exercised by their own administrators. The Comptroller of the
Treasury, and later the Comptroller General, had little to do with the
accounts of these corporations except in certain isolated instances
86
specifically directed by Congress.
When Skinner and Eddy Corporation presented its claims to the
Comptroller General, he declined to consider them, insisting that he had
neither the duty nor the power to do so. He disclaimed all jurisdiction
over the accounts of the Fleet Corporation and maintained that control
was in the hands of the Corporation itself or else the Shipping Board.
8Act of Mar. 3, 1797, 1 STAT. 515 (1797), 28 U. S. C. A. §774 (1928).
3Act of June 10, 1921, 42 STAT. 23 (1921), 31 U. S. C. A. §§41-120 (1927).
"Act of June 10, 1921, c. 18, §305, 42 STAT. 23, 24 (1921), 31 U. S. C. A. §71
(1927).
uAct of June 10, 1921, c. 18, §303, 42 STAT. 23 (1921), 31 U. S. C. A. §43
(1927).
" See, 275 U. S. 1, 6-8, 48 Sup. Ct. 12, 14, 72 L. ed. 131, 134-35 (1927).
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His position was upheld by the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
87
of the District of Columbia.
The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed these decisions,
holding that the Comptroller General had no jurisdiction over these
claims and had properly refused to consider them. The Court said:
"The Fleet Corporation is an entity distinct from the United States and
from any of its departments or boards, and the audit and control of its
financial transactions is, under the general rules of law and the administrative practice, committed to its own corporate officers, except so far
as control may be exerted by the Shipping Board." In this opinion, the
Court presented as a reason for the use of a corporation the ability to
use commercial methods and to be free from accountability to the
Treasury."8
Later, when the United States sued the Company, the district court
held that presentation of the claims to the Shipping Board was sufficient
to meet the requirements of the statute" so as to enable the claims to be
used as a set-off to the government's suit.90
Three months after the decision by the Supreme Court, an article
appeared in the Virginia Law Review criticizing the use of the corporate device by the government specifically on the ground that the
General Accounting Office did not audit or control the expenditures
made by the corporations. 9 ' This article was written by one of the
legal advisers in that office. 92
In the fall of 1933, when government owned corporations were being created in rapid succession, Comptroller General McCarl reversed
the stand he took in 1923 and 1924 when he had claimed he had no
power or duty to audit the accounts of the Fleet Corporation and was
sustained by the Supreme Court after three years of litigation. He insisted that expenditures made in setting up corporations in Delaware
had to be approved by him and that the accounts of all the corporations
'8 F. (2d) 1011 (C.of A. D. of C. 1925).

' See, ScHNELL, Federally Owned Corporations and Their Legal Problems
(1936) 14 N. C. L. REv. 238, 244.
'Supra note 82.
"United States v. Skinner & Eddy Corporation, 28 F. (2d) 373 (W. D. Wash.
1928), decree modified, 35 F. (2d) 889 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929). See also, In re
Skinner & Eddy Corporation, 265 U. S. 86, 44 Sup. Ct. 446, 68 L. ed. 912 (1924) ;

United States v. Skinner & Eddy Corporation, 5 F. (2d) 708 (W. D. Wash. 1925).
But see, United States v. Fisher Flouring Mills Company, 295 Fed. 691 (W. D.
Wash. 1924) in which it was held that in a suit by the United States on a cause
of action assigned to it by the Fleet Corporation the defendant was not entitled to
plead as a set-off claims against the Fleet Corporation which had not been presented
to the accounting officers of the Treasury as prescribed by 1 STAr. 515 (1797), 28
U. S. C. A. §774 (1928). It was probably because of this case that the Skinner &
Eddy Corporation wanted the Comptroller General to pass upon its claims.
IMcGuire, Government by Corporations, 14 VA. L. REv. 182 (1928). See
also, McGuire, The United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation
(1922) 56 Am. L. R.av. 786.
'McGuire still is counsel in the General Accounting Office.
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were subject to audit by the General Accounting Office. Those in
charge of the various corporations resisted the Comptroller General's
claim to jurisdiction because they did not want to be subject to the red
tape necessarily involved with accountability to him and because they
did not want him to interfere with their free spending. A heated controversy developed, especially between Secretary of the Interior Ickes
and Comptroller General McCarl concerning the financing of the Public
Works Emergency Housing Corporation.9 3 The difficulties were resolved by the issuance of an Executive Order which, it was said, the
president issued at the insistence of the Comptroller General. This
order provided that "accounts of all receipts and expenditures by governmental agencies, including corporations, created after March 3, 1933,
the accounting procedure for which is not otherwise prescribed by law,
shall be rendered through the General Accounting Office in such manner, to such extent and at such times as the Comptroller General of
the United States may prescribe for settlement and adjustment. .... -94
This order makes all the recently created government corporations
except the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which was created January 22nd, 1932, subject to the jurisdiction of the Comptroller General.
The charters of those corporations created -by Congress are silent as to
the auditing of their accounts with the exception of that of the Tennessee Valley Authority. Section 9(b) of the Tennessee Valley Authority
Act provides that the Comptroller General shall audit the transactions
of the TVA at such times as he shall determine. No other procedure
has been provided for either the Congressionally or State chartered corporations.
Some of the corporations have objected strenuously to this supervision by the Comptroller General claiming that it hampers them in their
operations because of the delay entailed and because of the refusal of the
Comptroller General to approve certain expenditures the corporations
deem necessary and proper. Other corporations have no objections to
make and say the accountability to the Comptroller General makes little
or no difference in the effectiveness of their operations. 95
Employees of the Emergency Fleet Corporation were held not to be
governmental employees but rather employees of a private corporation.
In United States v. Strang, 6 which was discussed previously in connection with crimes involving the corporations, 97 an inspector employed by
See, Schnell and Wettach, Corporationsas Agencies of the Recovery Program
(1934) 12 N. C. L. Rzv. 77.
"Ex. Order No. 6549, Jan. 3, 1934.
' See, generally, Munson, The Duties of the Controller as a Corporate Officer
(1934) 20 A. B. A. J. 57 (with reference to government corporations).
'254
U. S. 491, 41 Sup. Ct. 165, 65 L. ed. 368 (1921), cited note 51, supra.
91
Supra page 351.
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the Emergency Fleet Corporation was held not to be an agent of the
United States so as to make him subject to prosecution under section 41
of the Criminal Code98 which makes it a criminal offense for an officer
or agent of a business concern to be employed or act as an officer or
agent of the United States for the transaction of business with such
concern.
In a later case in the Court of Claims, a brigadier-general of the
United States Army who had retired and become president and then
general manager of the Fleet Corporation from July 1926 to March
1929 brought suit against the United States for that portion of his retired officer's pay which had been withheld during that peri6d.09 This
pay was withheld from him while he was connected with the Fleet
Corporation because of the congressional prohibition against dual office
holding. The Court of Claims awarded him the amount so withheld,
holding that the Fleet Corporation was a private corporation and not
a part of the government and that consequently his only government
office was that of retired brigadier-general. He was held to be entitled
to the regular compensation attached to that office. The court held that
a position with the Fleet Corporation was not a government office within
the meaning of the legislation concerned.
The contrary view has been taken by the Supreme Court of Appeals
of Virginia with respect to an attorney employed by the Home Owners'
Loan Corporation. The city attorney of Bristol, Virginia, was appointed a district attorney for the Corporation. Thereupon, a quo
warranto proceeding was commenced to remove him from his city office
on the ground that the Virginia Code prohibited any person holding a
federal position from holding a state office. The court discussed the
Home Owners' Loan Act and concluded that the Corporation was such
an instrumentality of the United States that the attorney's "employment as attorney for the Home Owners' Loan Corporation is under the
government of the United States, and his acceptance of such employment and the emoluments therefrom was in contravention of section
290 of the Code." However, the court, in the exercise of its discretion,
refused to grant the writ and cause him to surrender his city office on
the ground that no practical benefit would result to the relator or the
general public.99 '
A Pennsylvania court held that in a claim for compensation under
the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act made by a workman
who was injured in the course of his employment with the Emergency
'Act of March 4, 1909, c. 321, §41, 35 STAT. 1088, 1097 (1909), 18 U. S. C. A.
§93 (1927).
'Dalton v. United States, 71 Ct. Cl. 421 (1931).
" Corn. ex rel, Kelly v. Rouse, 163 Va. 841, 178 S. E. 37 (1935).
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Fleet Corporation, an answer denying liability on the ground that the
Corporation was an arm of the government and not subject to the laws
of Pennsylvania could not be maintained. 10 0 It would seem inferable
from this that the court regarded the workman as an employee of the
Corporation and not of the government.
Nor are employees of the Panama Railroad Company regarded as
employees of the government. An opinion of the Attorney-General
held that such employees were employees of a private corporation.' 0 '
Also, a federal statute relating to the limitation of hours of daily service of laborers and mechanics employed upon public works by the United
States does not apply to those employed by the Panama Railroad Company.10 2 However, employees of the Alaska Railroad have been held
by the Attorney-General to be employees of the United States.' 0 3 In
one of the opinions concerning the people employed by that railroad,
the Comptroller-General held that an employee of the Alaska Railroad
was an employee of the United States, prohibited from receiving payment for both services in the Alaskan legislature and to the railroad at
the same time. 0 4
The government owned corporations are considered distinct entities
with respect to the guarantee of the bonds of some of them by the
United States. The bonds are not direct obligations of the government
and are not primarily payable by it, they must first be presented to the
corporations for payment. If, upon demand by a holder of guaranteed
bonds, the interest or principal of the bonds were not paid by the Corporation, then the bonds might be presented to the Treasury for payment. This procedure was set out by the Attorney-General in an opinion to the Secretary of the Treasury 0 5 and indicates that he conceived
of the corporations and the government as being separate and distinct.
Decisions of the Comptroller of the Treasury in 1920 and of the
Comptroller-General in 1921 held that such officials, in certain circumstances, considered the Fleet Corporation and the Housing Corporation
as parts of the government rather than units by themselves. Freight
shipments of property of the Fleet Corporation were held entitled to land
'1 Sullivan v. U. S. S. B. Emergency Fleet Corporation, 76 Pa. Super. Ct. 30
(1921).
The United States Supreme Court dismissed a writ of error and refused
certiorari without discussing the question. The Court said that the record did not
show a controversy over the validity of any treaty, statute, authority, federal or
state, on constitutional grounds so as to support the writ of error. U. S. - S. B.
Emergency Fleet Corporation v. Sullivan, 261 U. S. 146, 43 Sup. Ct. 292, 67 L. ed.
577 (1923).
m 25 Op. A.G. 465, 469.
2 Act of August 1, 1892, 27 STAT. 340, 40 U. S. C. A. §321 (1928).
' 5 Op. C. G. 806 (1926).
m8 Dec. C. G. 420 (1929).
Opinion of the Attorney General to the Secretary of the Treasury, September

14th, 1934.
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grant deductions and the preferential government freight rates because
such property was that of the United States. 106 Similarly, hotels owned
by the United States Housing Corporation were held to be public buildings of the United States and entitled to preferential gas rates and free
water from the District of Columbia under certain statutes entitling the
federal government to such preferences from the Government of the
District. 0 7 Another decision held that the United States Housing Corporation, "which was established by authority of law to perform a governmental function and was maintained and supported from funds of
the United States," was a government establishment and that miscellaneous supplies for it had to be purchased in accordance with the federal
statute providing that certain miscellaneous supplies for executive departments and other government establishments in Washington should
be purchased under contracts made by the Secretary of the Treasury.10 8
Although these cases concerning the governmental character of the
federally owned corporations have been presented as groups and types, it
cannot be asserted with definiteness that any future case falling within
the same category would be decided the same way. Each case would
probably depend upon the circumstances surrounding the action, any
statutes involved, and the arguments of counsel. Nor can a rule be
laid down as to when the courts will hold the corporations to be a part
of the government and to partake of its privileges and immunities or to
be separate and apart from the government.
VI
The various government owned corporations, whether organized
under an Act of Congress or incorporated under the laws of some state,
would seem to be beyond the control or regulation of any state except
so far as might be permitted by the corporations or by the federal government. Whether or not they are to be considered as a part of the
government itself or as distinct entities, they are governmental instrumentalities and as such do partake of certain governmental immunities.
This proposition that the states cannot interfere with the operations of
federal instrumentalities, established as early as the case of McCulloch
v. Maryla;td'09 was upheld in the taxation cases previously discussed.

It was reaffirmed in cases involving national banks in which it was held
that national banks, being instrumentalities of the government, "the
states can exercise no control over them nor in any wise affect their
' 1 Dec. C. G. 279 (1921).

Dec. C. T. 163 (1920). The
1916, 39 STAT. 716 (1916), 40 U. S. C.
' 26 Dec. C. T. 673 (1920). The
1910, c. 297, §4, 36 STAT. 531 (1910), 41
' 17 U. S.316, 4 L. ed. 579 (1819).
10727

statute involved was the Act of Sept. 1,
A. §23 (1928).
statute involved was the Act of June 17,
U. S. C. A. §7 (1928).
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operation, except in so far as Congress may see proper to permit." 11
The same view was evinced in Stockton v. Baltinore and New York
RailroadCompany,"' decided by Justice Bradley of the Supreme Court
while sitting in the Circuit Court in New Jersey, which disposes of the
matter of state control in the following language:
"It is undoubtedly just and proper that foreign corporations should
be subject to the legitimate police regulations of the state, and should
have, if required, an agent in the state to accept service of process when
sued for acts done or contracts made therein ....
But in the pursuit of
business authorized by the government of the United States, and under
its protection, the corporations of other states cannot be prohibited or
obstructed by any state.... At all events, if Congress, in the execution
of its powers, chooses to employ the intervention of a proper corporation, whether of the state, or out of the state, we see no reason
why it should not do so. There is nothing in the constitution to prevent
it from making contracts with or conferring powers upon state corporations for carrying out its own legitimate purposes. What right of
the state would be invaded? The corporation thus employed, or empowered, in executing the will of Congress, could do nothing which the
state could rightfully oppose or object to."
It is the policy of the presently operating government corporations
to comply with those state laws which do not interfere with the operations of the corporations. This policy has been adopted in order to
avoid as much conflict as possible between the corporations and state
and local officials. The corporations do insist, however, that such compliance with state laws in no way affects their privileges and prerogatives as federal instrumentalities. 11 2
Although two cases involving the Emergency Fleet Corporation suggested that it was subject in certain respects to state recordation regulations, 1 13 it does not seem than any real encroachment by the states
" Farmers' and Mechanics' National Bank v. Deering, 91 U. S. 29, 34, 23 L. ed.
196, 199 (1875); Easton v. Iowa, 188 U. S. 220, 23 Sup. Ct. 388, 47 L. ed. 452

(1903).

32 Fed. 9, 14 (C. C. D. N. J. 1887).
This information was obtained from counsel for several of the corporations.
1I Shooters Island Shipyard Co. v. Standard Shipbuilding Corp., 293 Fed. 706
(C. C. A. 3rd, 1923), reaff'd, 3 F. (2d) 1022 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1925) suggested that
the Fleet Corporation, "though a governmental agency, does not stand in the place
of the government so as to share the immunities of the sovereign, but in its transactions as a distinct corporate entity it was bound to observe the law of the state
in which it was doing business." In this case, the point involved was the execution
and recordation of a chattel mortgage to the Fleet Corporation, which the court

said had to be in conformity with the state law.

Gielow v. Eastern Shore Shipbuilding Corp., 265 Fed. 845 (D. C. Md. 1919)
held that the Fleet Corporation, even though a government agent, could not, without authority from Congress, make a contract for construction of vessels giving it
title to material not yet on board the vessels, which title would be valid against
the trustee in bankruptcy of the construction company, thought not recorded, as
required by state law. It was held that the Fleet Corporation had to comply with
the state recordation statutes.

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

upon the governmental immunities of the corporations will be permitted
by the courts.
Nor should state regulations or control of these corporations be
permitted. Otherwise, they would be hindered in their operations and
the advantages gained from the use of the corporate device would be
lost.
VII
There are as yet few reported decisions involving the government
owned corporations organized under the present administration. However, it is highly probable that any cases involving them which may
arise will be decided upon the basis of the law as established by decisions in cases involving earlier government corporations. If there is no
definite rule respecting a problem that might arise, the principles of the
previous decisions will undoubtedly be applied.
The law of government owned corporations seems to have developed
upon a practical basis. In general, the interests of the federal government have been well protected and the proper functioning of the
corporations expedited. At the same time, the corporations have been
reduced to the status of an ordinary suitor before the courts, and the
principles of law as applied to private litigants have controlled when
there would be no disadvantage to the federal government by so doing.
This has been a sound development especially suitable to organizations
such as these. The government owned and operated corporations are
performing useful governmental functions in an efficient manner and
should partake of the privileges and immunities of the federal government. At the same time, by using the corporate device, the federal government has adopted an instrument of private law and should be bound
by the ordinary rules of law applicable to corporations generally. Thus
far, the cases involving government corporations have been decided, for
the most part, on a sound basis. There are numerous questions which havnot yet arisen in connection with these corporations. When they arise,
the courts will necessarily be guided by the precedents which have been
discussed herein. Thus the development of the law of government
owned corporation may be expected to follow lines of practical adjustment-already indicated both by courts and administrators-as consistent with government ownership and operation of large business
enterprises.1 1 4
"No attempt has been made in this article to discuss or evaluate the work and
activities of the various government corporations. However, the use of the corporate device as a method of performing governmental activities has been justified
by the efficient and rapid manner in which most of the corporations have functioned.
The use of corporations owned and operated by the federal government has now
become an established method of carrying out certain functions of the government.

